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REDD+ is the term used for a pro-posed multilateral policy aiming to incentivize developing countries 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
increase removals by limiting deforesta-
tion and forest degradation, conserving 
forest carbon stocks, sustainably manag-
ing forests and enhancing forest carbon 
stocks. It is being developed within the 
United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with the 
aim of providing developing countries 
with financial incentives to take action to 
mitigate climate change. In the so-called 
full implementation phase it may enable 
polluters to pay for their emissions offsets. 
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REDD+ is intended to be implemented 
as a national and results-based policy, 
in which payments would be related to 
actual carbon emissions reductions and 
paid in proportion to these at the end of 
an accounting period (the length of which 
is yet to be determined). Performance is 
to be measured taking into account the 
country’s entire forest estate, in part to 
deal with internal leakage.1 The reduction 
of emissions should be measured against a 
reference level representing the estimated 
level of emissions that would have occurred 
without the REDD+ intervention. It is not 
yet clear whether REDD+ payments for 
carbon will be provided through a market 
structure (with credits, as is done in the 
Clean Development Mechanism) or via a 
global fund, or through a combination of 
different financial instruments. The failure 
of the Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC to agree on binding emissions 
reduction targets for industrialized coun-
tries, and the character of some activities 
(e.g. conservation), makes the use of market 
instruments – seen by some observers as 
the most efficient and effective approach – 
less likely to be the only instruments used, 
at least in the short term. Agrawal, Nepstad 
and Chhatre (2011) provide a good over-
view of the current state of negotiations 
on REDD+ and the issues under debate.
NATIONAL VERSUS PROJECT 
APPROACH
One reason why parties to the UNFCCC 
have favoured a national-level rather than 
a project approach to REDD+ is that it is 
evident that it will require national poli-
cies and measures that go far beyond the 
forest sector, since many of the drivers of 
deforestation and forest degradation are 
rooted in the wider economy. Globally, 
the strongest driver of deforestation is the 
expansion of large-scale agriculture and 
cattle-ranching; to be effective, therefore, 
most national REDD+ strategies will need 
to find ways to reduce such cross-sectoral 
drivers. Logging – legal or illegal – can 
be a contributing factor to deforestation 
if conducted unsustainably, and bring-
ing about sustainable forest management 
requires the political will to strengthen 
forest laws and improve the ways in which 
they are enforced.
AN INSTRUMENT FOR 
COMMUNITIES?
Much of the literature sees REDD+ as 
an instrument directed at communities 
and other small-scale forest owners and 
managers, based on the idea of payments 
for ecosystem services (PES) and the expe-
rience of many small-scale forest carbon 
projects in the voluntary sector, such as 
those in Central America, for example 
Costa Rica (Kaimowitz, 2008; Agrawal 
and Angelsen, 2009; Engel, Wünscher and 
Wunder, 2009). Significantly, all 26 (as 
of May 2012) of the REDD+ readiness 
proposals presented to the World Bank’s 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), 
and most of those in the United Nations 
Collaborative Programme on Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries 
(UN-REDD), make reference to commu-
nity forest management – even for countries 
like Argentina, where very little forest is in 
community hands. In some countries (e.g. 
Ethiopia, Madagascar, Nepal, the United 
Republic of Tanzania and many Andean 
and Central American countries), a nation-
ally organized community management 
programme is central to the proposed 
national REDD+ approach, although how 
(and especially to whom) payments will 
be made is usually not specified.
Who will capture the benefits?
There is a danger that a national-level 
approach to REDD+ could reverse the 
gains that have been made in the last 
20 years in the decentralization of for-
est management and the recognition of 
1 Leakage occurs when emissions in one 
location are displaced to another as a result 
of intervention in the first location. In a 
national approach to REDD+, leakage within 
the country would not be an issue, because 
changes in emissions are aggregated at the 
national level.
In some countries there is concern 
that local communities will not receive 
economic rewards from REDD+, 
particularly where tenure is informal. 
Mapping and recording carbon stock 
growth may strengthen community claims 
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community rights over forest products 
(Phelps, Webb and Agrawal, 2010). Doubts 
have been expressed about the effective-
ness of REDD+ given the political and 
economic pressures involved and the poor 
track record that many countries have in 
forest governance (e.g. Corbera, Estrada 
and Brown, 2010). Concern has also been 
raised – particularly by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and in the bilat-
eral donor sector – about whether local 
communities will receive any economic 
rewards from REDD+, especially where 
tenure is informal (e.g. Dooley et al., 2008; 
Naughton-Treves and Day, 2012). In areas 
where the forest is formally owned by 
government, the risk arises that people 
who currently exercise customary rights 
may be alienated from the forest on the 
grounds that they are responsible for the 
degradation, and that even if they engage 
in activities which ensure the sustainability 
of carbon stocks, they may not be entitled 
to the financial benefits. Even in countries 
like Mexico, where most of the forest is 
legally held by agrarian communities, it 
is not clear what rights such communi-
ties may have over carbon (Robles, 2011). 
Women may be especially disadvantaged 
because in many societies they face tenure 
restrictions on land and forest resources 
(Setyowati, 2012). It is certainly possible 
that governments could capture all or most 
of the financial benefits, leaving very little 
to trickle down to the communities and 
small landowners who are practising the 
actual forest management. 
Several NGOs have campaigned to 
ensure that the benefits of REDD+ reach 
local communities, although so far few 
have pursued the issue of direct owner-
ship of carbon (Peskett and Brodnig, 2011; 
Costenbader, 2009). There has also been a 
movement towards what is called nested 
REDD+, which has been interpreted by 
some as a system in which credits would 
be allocated directly by the state to forest 
owners or managers at the local level and 
could then be sold or exchanged by them 
in the international market (Cortez et al., 
2010). Most proponents acknowledge, how-
ever, that these credits would have to be 
reconciled with accounts at the national 
level and deducted from total national 
credits through jurisdictional account-
ing (Chargas et al., 2011). In practice this 
approach could create considerable dif-
ficulties, since under the UNFCCC such 
local carbon credits would only be avail-
able for sale to the extent that the country as 
a whole has reduced forest-related green-
house gas emissions. Thus, overall, there 
is still much uncertainty as to how rewards 
for community forest management will 
fit within national REDD+ programmes.
WHAT CAN COMMUNITy FOREST 
MANAGEMENT ACHIEVE?
In resolving the issues identified above it is 
necessary to take a hard look at what com-
munity forest management can realistically 
achieve under REDD+. At an international 
workshop hosted by the FCPF on the role of 
community monitoring in REDD+ (FCPF, 
2011), participants from 15 countries with 
many years of experience in community 
forestry carried out an exercise to estimate 
the extent to which different forms of com-
munity forest management are contributing 
to reducing deforestation and degradation 
and to the enhancement of carbon stocks. 
The results of the exercise are sum-
marized in Table 1, which distinguishes 
between active community manage-
ment, usually on state-owned land (as, 
for example, in community-based forest 
management and joint forest management 
programmes), community management 
on a community’s own land through PES, 
and large-scale community reserves des-
ignated primarily for conservation. The 
table shows that the first two forms of com-
munity management tend to reduce forest 
TABLE 1. Estimated current contribution of community forest management to reducing greenhouse gas emissions due to 
deforestation and forest degradation and by enhancing carbon stocks, by type of community forestry or governance regime
Type of community forestry/governance regime Typical area of 
forest under 
management:  
total/per  
household
Current estimated contribution to: Notes
reducing 
emissions 
from 
deforestation
reducing 
emissions 
from forest 
degradation
enhancement 
of forest 
carbon stock 
Community-based, collaborative and participatory 
forest management on state land; management plans 
ensure that the extraction of forest products is within 
sustainable limits in return for community rights to these 
products (e.g. Indonesia/Kenya/Nepal/United Republic 
of Tanzania/Viet Nam models)
50–500 ha/ 
1–5 ha 
Medium/ 
low 
High to  
very high
High Highly dependent on 
administration and 
allocation of rights to 
communities
Community management on land owned by communities, 
incentivized by subsidies from government for improved 
management and conservation; may involve sustainable 
extraction of wood and non-wood products, and 
conservation (e.g. PES model, Mexico/Costa Rica model)
50–500 ha/ 
1–5 ha 
Medium High Medium  
to high
Highly dependent 
on funding (PES) for 
sustainability
Indigenous peoples’ reserves, typically involving large 
forest areas and low population densities, where rights 
to ancestral lands are formally recognized, deterring 
incursions by external loggers, etc. (e.g. Amazon model)
5 000– 
50 000 ha/ 
50–500 ha 
High Medium  
to high
Low Needs strong support 
from government to 
overcome external 
pressures for 
resources
Source: Adapted from FCPF (2011).
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degradation through the improved manage-
ment of the extraction process; they also 
often result in increases in carbon stocks 
but are less effective in reducing deforesta-
tion. The reason for this is that a great deal 
of degradation is a direct result of local 
subsistence use of wood and non-wood 
resources when extraction is unsustainably 
high.2 Reducing such degradation is likely 
to have relatively low opportunity costs 
and the success of community forest man-
agement programmes in countries such as 
Mexico, Nepal and the United Republic of 
Tanzania demonstrate that those costs are 
not prohibitive under a well-functioning 
communal regime.
It is doubtful, however, that commu-
nity management is a bulwark against 
deforestation, which to a large extent is 
driven by outside economic forces and for 
which the opportunity costs may be much 
higher. Community forest management 
regimes may be unable to withstand the 
market forces exerted when much higher 
rents can be earned by converting to, or 
selling forest for, other land uses such as 
logging, cattle-ranching, plantations and 
urban development. Moreover, these mar-
ket incentives may often be reinforced by 
external political pressures or simply by 
brute force. Large-scale indigenous peo-
ples’ reserves such as those in the Amazon, 
on the other hand, are usually not subject 
to significant locally caused degradation, 
given the nature of livelihood strategies 
and very low population densities in many 
such areas. Formalizing and publicizing 
a community’s ownership of its ancestral 
lands strengthens its rights over the for-
est and should help to discourage outside 
agents from attempting to deforest or to 
harvest the forest for their own benefit.
A NICHE FOR COMMUNITy FOREST 
MANAGEMENT
Strikingly, national plans for REDD+ 
have not clearly distinguished between 
deforestation, forest degradation and for-
est enhancement. Degradation is often 
implicitly understood to be just a step on 
the way to full deforestation, but this does 
not always reflect reality because degrada-
tion and deforestation are in most cases 
the result of different processes. Where 
degradation has been addressed in the 
REDD+ literature as an independent 
phenomenon, this has mostly been in the 
context of selective logging in rainforests, 
such as in Amazonia (e.g. Souza, Roberts 
and Cochrane, 2005; Asner et al., 2005). It 
has not been in the broader context of the 
small but persistent pressures exerted on 
forests by local communities, which are 
both widespread – particularly in the more 
densely populated dry tropical forests and 
savannahs — and growing, in line with 
high local population growth. 
Reducing degradation and 
stimulating stock enhancement in 
community forests
The most effective sites for community 
forest management in REDD+ may well 
be in moderately to heavily populated 
areas – especially in the broad belts of 
2 In addition to the overharvesting of timber, 
poles, woodfuel and non-wood forest 
products, degradation can be caused by 
the grazing of privately owned animals 
in communal forests, escaped fire from 
agriculture, and charcoal production.
Participatory mapping 
by the Cuzalapa 
Women’s Group, 
Mexico. Including 
community mapping 
and monitoring as a 
management activity 
could be an important 
stimulus for REDD+ 
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tropical dry forest and savannahs – where 
forest degradation is primarily the result 
of inefficient use by local communities. 
For example, community forest manage-
ment in savannah woodlands in East and 
West Africa has been shown to achieve 
sequestration of 1–20 tonnes of carbon 
dioxide per hectare per year, in addition to 
reductions in emissions from degradation, 
which may be in the order of 2 tonnes per 
hectare per year (Skutsch and Solis, 2011; 
Skutsch and Ba, 2009). 
It is not that the final consumption of 
the forest products needs to be, or can be, 
decreased – these are an essential part of 
the livelihoods of many communities – but 
that significant improvements in forest-
based carbon storage can be achieved by 
improving the overall management of the 
forest. Communities can be encouraged to 
adopt more sustainable harvesting prac-
tices to reduce degradation, with either 
direct carbon payments within REDD+ 
or other incentives. The latter need not be 
financial and could include more secure 
legal recognition of land rights, guaranteed 
rights to an agreed level of harvesting, the 
protection of cultural areas, technologi-
cal improvements, and support in finding 
new products or markets for wood and 
non-wood forest products (Hecht, 2009). 
Any scheme for payments to a community 
for carbon is likely to have more impact 
and be more acceptable where comple-
mentary PES programmes are operating 
in the same community, for example in 
Mexico (Larrazabal et al., 2012; Benneker 
and McCall, 2009). The returns from car-
bon payments are expected to be low, but 
where the payments are adding to existing 
PES programmes, for example biodiversity 
conservation or hydrological or pollination 
services, the overall financial benefits for 
the community of improved management 
may be sufficient to support improved for-
est management. In many cases, such an 
approach will not only reduce degradation, 
it will reverse it, leading to increases in 
carbon stock (“enhancement”) over time. 
Including community mapping and mon-
itoring as a management activity may be an 
important stimulus for REDD+ (McCall, 
2011; Knowles et al., 2010; Coleman and 
Steed, 2009). It has been shown that com-
munities are able to measure carbon stock 
increases and monitor other environmen-
tal variables with considerable accuracy 
and at low cost (Larrazabal et al., 2012; 
Danielsen et al., 2010; Skutsch et al., 2009). 
Significantly, at least 10 of the 26 REDD 
readiness proposals at the FCPF specifi-
cally mention community monitoring as 
part of community approaches to REDD+. 
Deforestation has to be tackled at a much 
higher level, using economic and political 
instruments to influence the direct (usu-
ally non-community) agents and indirect 
drivers. Deforestation should be distin-
guished clearly in national strategies from 
community-level efforts to reduce degrada-
tion. Dividing national policy in this way 
could also result in a more transparent 
and equitable system for allocating carbon 
credits, in which achievements in reducing 
deforestation would be attributed to gov-
ernment at the national or state level and 
reductions in degradation and increases in 
carbon stock in specific forest areas would 
be attributed to local actors (Balderas and 
Skutsch, 2012). 
Community conservation
Communities might be involved in reduc-
ing deforestation through, for example, 
the creation of large-scale community-
owned reserves in areas where there is 
low population density. In such cases, the 
primary REDD+ approach would be con-
servation rather than sustainable use, and 
the major political instrument would be 
the formalization of indigenous or other 
traditional rights to land. There is always 
the danger that a reduction in deforestation 
in such reserves would simply be offset 
by an increase elsewhere (i.e. leakage). 
Thus, such approaches to forest carbon 
conservation can only ever be part of a 
more comprehensive approach to reducing 
deforestation and forest degradation, which 
has to face up to the twin drivers of unsus-
tainable over-consumption and human 
demographics (Skutsch and McCall, 2010).
CONCLUSION
In sum, community forest management 
can play a major role in REDD+, espe-
cially when programmes for its stimulation 
are focused in areas where it can be most 
effective. We suggest that community for-
est management may be more effective in 
addressing emissions from forest degrada-
tion than from deforestation, and that it 
may be particularly efficient in dry tropical 
forests and savannahs, where generally 
population densities are much higher and 
the use of tree resources more widespread 
than in rainforests. u
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